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INTRODUCTION
Margaret Martin
MS. MARTIN: Hi. Welcome back to the last session of the day. My name
is Margaret Martin, I am an assistant professor at the University of Western
Ontario in the Faculty of Law. The topic of this afternoon's session is "The
Effects of Post-9/11 Border Security on Canada-U.S. Economic
Competitiveness."
Now, the first question I think we have to ask is whether 9/11 has had a
negative impact on trade between our two nations. And as we will see in our
first presentation, answering this question is no easy task because there are so
many detailed variables that have to be analyzed. And after we understand
the past, only then can we begin to make recommendations for the future,
and this will be the topic of our second discussion. So at least partly we will
deal with the future policy recommendations.
Now, today's talk is particularly pressing because we cannot just sit back
and be passive about this issue. If we do not make policy recommendations
to our different governments, then we will not have healthy trade relations in
the future. So this is why I am thrilled to announce our distinguished
speakers, Paul Storer, who is our first speaker, and Gary Hufbauer.
Paul Storer is a professor and chair of the Economics Department of
Western Washington University.' He is a member of the board of directors of
the Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference.2 And this is his latest
1 Western Washington University, Paul Storer, available at
http://www.cbe.wwu.edu/PersonProfile.asp?PersonlD=47 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
2 Pacific Northwest Regional Economic Conference, Board of Directors, available at
http://www.pnrec.org/directors.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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book; I thought I would plug it for him. It is excellent. I read it recently. And
it is entitled The Impact of 9/11 on Canada-U.S. Trade, and it was co-written
by Steven Globerman, and I recommend it.
And then our second speaker is Gary Hufbauer, and he has resumed his
position as Reginald Jones Senior Fellow in 1998. 4 Previously he was
Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Financial Diplomacy at
Georgetown University, and served in the U.S. Treasury Department from
1974 to 1980.5 And he was very prolific last year, he had two co-authored
books. The first one entitled Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,6 third
edition, and the second entitled U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income.7
So without further ado, Paul Storer.
CANADIAN SPEAKER
Paul Storer*
MR. STORER: Thanks, Margaret. Thank you to the organizers for
inviting me to the conference and for putting the two economists at the end
of the day.
Thank you for the plug on the book, too. The book has the same title as
my presentation, no coincidence. I felt we maybe should have renamed the
book "The Audacity of Despair" due to my despair over what is happening to
3 Paul Globerman and Paul Storer, The Impact of 9/lIon U.S.-Canada Trade, Canada-
U.S. Law Institute, Apr. 2008, available at
http://cusli.org/conferences/annual/presentations2008/Storer%20911 %2OTrade.ppt (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008).
4 Middle East Policy Council, Gary Hufbauer, available at
http://www.mepc.org/resources/hufbauer.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
5 Peterson Institute for International Economics, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, available at
http://www.iie.com/staff/author-bio.cfm?author-id=27 (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
6 Id.
7 Id.
Paul Storer is Professor and Chair of the Economics Department at Western Washington
University. He is a member of the board of directors of the Pacific Northwest Regional Eco-
nomic Conference (PNREC) and served as editor of the Northwest Journal of Business and
Economics from 2001 through 2005. Storer's research focuses on Canada-US business and
economic relations and cross-border integration. Among Storer's recent publications (both
joint with Steven Globerman) are: "Canada-U.S. Integration Following NAFTA" (in North
American Economic and Financial Integration, Elsevier, 2004) and The Impacts of 9/11 on
Canada-U.S. Trade (University of Toronto Press, 2008). He has previously published in such
journals as the Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Public Policy, the American Review
of Canadian Studies, Contemporary Economic Policy, and the Journal of Banking and
Finance. Storer is also a coauthor on the 13th edition of the introductory economics textbook
by Lipsey, Ragan, and Storer.
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the relationship that Canada and the United States have built over time. I am
concerned by the extent to which those gains may be getting eroded by a
variety of factors, some of which may be around the nexus of security. The
impact of these developments on trade and competitiveness are some of the
issues I am going to be addressing in this presentation.
The reference to audacity comes in because we needed a dose of audacity
back at the time when people in Canada took a leap of faith in negotiating the
Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and that kind of audacity of
thinking does not seem to be in abundance presently in terms of moving
forward. Whether it should or should not be I will leave Gary to talk about,
so we will move through this.
Let me just tell you again about the focus of the presentation. I am going
to try to talk about not just the evidence that Steve and I have, but other
evidence that I will mention about the actual factual quantitative evidence
related to how border security problems affected the trade between Canada
and the United States since 9/11. Now, if I was not an economist, I would
probably just show you this graph and be done and then turn it over to Gary.
Looking at a graph of Canadian exports of goods to the United States
from 1996 to 2005, the eyeball is drawn to what looks like a significant
decline after 2001. The shaded period shown in the graph on the screen is the
post-9/l1 period where we see a sharp drop-off in the amount of the
Canadian surface export (rail, pipeline, and, predominantly, truck) flows to
the United States from Canada. And you can see why it seems like a
precipitous drop-off after the second quarter of 2001.
Now you would be tempted of course to just ascribe this decline in
exports to security events, but it could be other things are going on. We have
the usual suspects, which we will address more carefully later. The list of
suspects includes changes in the level of economic activity in that we know
there was a slowdown, changes in the exchange rate, or changes in other
economic factors such as tariffs on lumber.
Being economists, what Steve and I have done is to rely on a statistical
method known as linear regression to tease out the contributions of those
other "usual suspects". Anything that is left over after looking at other things,
we ascribe to post-9/11 security effects. So I cannot stop the story with the
graph on the screen, I have to show you more analysis. But I was supposed to
be multidisciplinary, too, so I will give you a little bit of history in the next
slide.
We have already had a reference to the Smoot-Hawley tariff escalation
from the time of the Great Depression. We all want to avoid repeating the
errors of Smoot-Hawley today. For the Canadians in the audience, we should
3
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also talk about avoiding the errors of the National Policy.8 The last time that
Canada built a policy wall at the border was in the late nineteenth century in
response to fears that American manufacturers would take away the
prosperity of Canadian manufacturing workers and farmers. On the screen
you see an election poster from this period and we see Sir John A.
Macdonald benevolently smiling down at his protected charges - the
manufacturers and farmers sheltered behind the tariff wall of the National
Policy.
This cartoon is reproduced from Michael Hart's excellent book A Trading
Nation, a comprehensive history of Canadian trade policy. 9 Michael provides
a fascinating description of the state of the Canadian auto industry just before
the Canada-U.S. Auto Pact came into effect in the mid 1960s.10 Michael cites
studies from the period which found car prices much higher in Canada than
in the United States l" while at the same time wages in the Canadian auto
industry, which was a domestic protected industry, were lower.'
2
So prices were high and wages were low in Canada and to make matters
worse the choice of models available in Canada was incredibly limited. 13
What happened after the Auto Pact, which moved Canada and the U.S. into
an integrated North American market for the auto industry, is that economies
of scale and the ability to specialize were realized through binational
production. The automotive sector is the poster child for a binational model
of shared production that Stephen Blank describes as "making stuff together"
As a result of the Auto Pact, Canada moved to a situation where wages went
up, profitability went up, prices of cars went down, and model choice went
up. 4 And of course those are also the types of outcomes that we were
expecting from NAFTA and Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. These
broad agreements were supposed to bring all those benefits realized by the
auto industry and extend them to the all sectors of the economy.
One of my particular causes of despair is the fear that those benefits from
trade liberalization that should have spread throughout the economy have
8 See generally, Lorraine Eden & Maureen Appel Molot Canada's National Policies:
Reflections on 125 Years, 19 Can. Pub. Pol'y 232, 237-38 (1993) (discussing the high tariff
structure established by the third National Policy and the results on the Canadian economy).
9 Hart, Michael, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globali-
zation (University of British Columbia Press, 2003).
10 See id. at 240-70.
11 See id. at 241 (discussing that "Canadians often paid as much as 50 percent more than
Americans did for the same car").
12 See id. (concluding that "Canadian workers earned about 30 percent less than their US
counterparts").
13 See Hart, supra note 9.
14 See generally, Keeley, James F., Cast in Concrete for All Time? The Negotiation of the
Auto Pact, 16 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 281, 290 (1983) (discussing the multiple objectives of the Auto
Pact).
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failed to achieve their promise. In particular, smaller businesses are less able
to shoulder the costs of dealing with security and those businesses will find it
increasingly difficulty to exploit the benefits of NAFTA. 15 While the bigger
players will have a reasonable chance to foot the bill for increased security,
the smaller ones, for whom we were hoping to democratize free trade to a
greater extent, may be shut out of trading due to rising security costs.
I would now like to summarize some of the sources of evidence that
increased border security has affected Canada-U.S. trade. While I will mainly
focus on econometric studies. I will also talk about what is happening to the
waiting times, estimates of cost and profitability. I will also discuss findings
from surveys done by various authors, and then turn to the econometric
studies, both the one that Steve and I did and then one from the Conference
Board of Canada by Michael Burt.
The evidence related to border security and waiting times shows up in two
effects, both of which can have significant consequences. One effect is an
increase in average waiting times as measured by mean or median crossing
times. The other effect is an increase in variability of waiting times as
measured by standard deviations or variances.
We need to be concerned about the impact of security on both the average
length and variability of border delays. If you are waiting for a longer time at
the border, you are going to be burning more fuel, you will be later making
delivery, and it will cost more money for labor.' 6 The increase in variability
is also an issue because predicable arrival times are needed to get the benefits
of "just-in-time" inventory management systems. 17
A study conducted by Danielle Goldfarb for the Conference Board of
Canada has expressed the concern that efficient just-in-time procedures
might be replaced by potential wasteful duplication of facilities that are
needed as a form of insurance "just-in-case" there is a border disruption. 8 In
an earlier session at this conference we heard Garland Chow describe the
interesting case of such a "just-in-case" facility in Kent, Washington which
may well have been set up in order to have inventories on both sides of the
border. You only need the insurance policy created by this redundancy if you
15 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffery J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and
Challenges, Institute for International Economics (2005); see also John W. Foster & John
Dillon, NAFTA in Canada: The Era of a Supra-Constitution, in Hemispheric Social Alliance
59 (2003) (noting the Canadian business concern over U.S. security "preoccupations").
16Goldfarb, Danielle, Reaching a Tipping Point: Effects of Post-9/11 Border Security on
Canada's Trade and Investment, Conf. Board Can. 16 (2007).
17 E.g., Goldfarb, Danielle, Is Just-In-Case Replacing Just-In-Time? How Cross-Border
Trading Behaviour Has Changed Since 9/11, Conf. Board Can. 7 (2007) (discussing how
firms are now stockpiling materials instead of just-in-time materials handling).
18 See id.
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are worried about the possibility of significant variability in waiting times at
the border.
One observation I would like to make is that we have a lot of difficulty
getting consistent on-time serious data on waiting times. 9 It would be nice if
we had some better data over time on waiting times. What we have now
seems to be episodic and more anecdotal than scientific.
Another study that is relevant was conducted by Prem Gandhi of SUNY
Plattsburgh and Wayne Glass of Schoolcraft College in Michigan.20 Prem
and Wayne did some very interesting work in which they took the increased
waiting times experienced at the Canada-U.S. border and converted them
into an equivalent extra distance. 21 For example, if you have to wait an extra
hour, and you could drive 60 miles an hour, the increased border waiting
time effectively "widens" the border by 60 miles.
The next step in the Gandhi-Glass study is quite clever: they fed their
calculated increased in distances into gravity-type models (gravity models
explain trade between states and provinces). 22 Gravity models have a long
history of being used to explain the volume of trade based on factors such as
distance.23 The Gandhi and Glass method predicted declines in trade volumes
in the range of 12 to 20 percent level.24 Interestingly enough, similar
magnitudes of drops in Canadian exports were found in the econometric
study that Steven Globerman and I conducted, despite the fact that we used a
very different methodology. So we find the work of Gandhi and Glass very
interesting.
Some of the existing academic studies of border security effects have
attached dollar amounts to increased waiting times. You have already heard
discussion at this conference of costs in the millions or billions of dollars.
Similar increases in costs have been found for carriers involved in working
across the border.
One study by Lee, Martin, Ouellet and Vailancourt at the University of
Montreal looked at Quebec's exports to the United States and began by
19 Anneliese, Vance, Strategic Responses by Canadian and U.S. Exporters to Increased
U.S. Border Security Measures: A Firm-Level Analysis, 22 Econ. Dev. Q. 239, 240 (2008); see
also Border Wait Time Figures Not Accurate: Report, Can. Press (Sept. 14, 2008) available at
http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20080914/OTTborder080914/20080914/
(reporting that the average wait times given by the border agency was knowingly incorrect)
(last visited on Oct. 9, 2008).
20 See Gandhi, Prem and Wayne Glass, The Cost and Cost Incidence of Canada-U.S. Bor-
der Security, Oct. 2007, available at http://cibs.tamu.edu/border/pages/proceedings.html (au-
dio proceedings of the presentation).
21 See id.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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obtaining a dollar amount for the increase in transportation costs. 26 The study
then determined how much of these higher shipping costs would be passed
onto the final customer. Finally, they determine how much exports would fall
due to these price changes.27 A key ingredient of this last step is a measure of
how much demand falls when prices rise - something economists call the
price elasticity of demand. This procedure yields a much smaller decline in
exports from Quebec to the United States than was found by Gandhi and
Glass.28 In fact, the number reported by Lee at al is about one percent.29
Now, someone earlier in this conference said that lawyers will always
give you a yes-and-no answer. Well of course economists are just as
renowned for having giving answers containing the phrase "on the other
hand." It should be little surprise, then, that here is still some debate among
economists regarding the size of these elasticity estimates. The one percent
trade reduction found by Lee and her co-authors may be a bit low because
they use a fairly low price elasticity of demand number.30 Using higher (but
still plausible) price elasticities could give a trade effect as high as four or
five percent. But this modification still gives a number that is substantially
lower than what Gandhi and Glass or my study with Steven gets. So, I feel
obligated to provide full disclosure on some of the range of information that
is coming out about the effect of border security on trade.
There is an interesting development that has been identified from surveys
of Canadian exporters and U.S. importers. Evidence of changing export
practices has been reported by John McPherson from Export Development
Canada and by Anneliese Vance who recently finished her Ph.D. in
Geography at SUNY Buffalo.31 One of the trends that shows up in their
conversation with businesses is that Canadian firms that used to handle
customs and cross-border logistics operations themselves are now hiring
experts to do these tasks for them.32 For people who either are working in
trade law or in logistics, that is good news but it may be bad news for
exporters to the extent that it raises the costs of engaging in Canada-U.S.
trade.
26 Lee, L., Martin, P., Ouellet, E. and Vailancourt, F., "American Border Security Meas-
ures: Potential Economic Impacts and Policy Responses from a Quebec Perspective", Mon-
treal: University of Montreal, mimeo, 2005.
27 Id.
28 See Gandhi, supra note 20.
29 See Lee, supra note 26.
30 Id.
31 Alan D. MacPherson et al., The Impact of U.S. Government Antiterrorism Policies on
Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Commerce: An Exploratory Study from Western New York and
Southern Ontario, 58 Prof. Geographer 266 (2006).
32 See Anneliese, supra note 19.
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Anneliese finds that the businesses that are outsourcing their logistics
operations did so for two reasons. First, they believe that logistics firms have
the expertise to minimize border delays. A secondary reason is that Canadian
exporters felt they would be partly insulated from the consequences of
security-related border delays because exporters feel that the logistics firm
rather than the exporter will be blamed in the event of a delay at the border.33
If the use of logistics firms gives "cover" for Canadian exporters, then U.S.
firms might choose to keep on buying from Canadian suppliers.34 On the
other hand, if a U.S. firm needs an intermediate input to show up at their
factory they might not care whether a delay is the fault of the Canadian
manufacturer or the logistics company.35 If a shipment is late, it is late,
regardless of the reason. I know that Annaliese will be doing some more
follow-up work on this topic and I look forward to learning the results.
Let me now tell you about the econometric studies that Stephen
Globerman and I have done. Of course, economists love to explain their
models with equations containing Greek letters and here's ours:
Ln(Exports) = 3o + PI1ln(Yt-1) + 032PFXt-j + 3 D9 11
Basically what this equation says is that we explain the natural logarithm
of Canadian exports to the United States based on changes in two economic
variables with a direct impact on trade: Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
abbreviated as Y in this equation, and the Canada-U.S. exchange rate,
abbreviated as PFX. The final term in the equation, the P33 times D 9/11,
captures the effect of post-9/11 border security policy. We use a so-called a
dummy variable, an on/off binary variable, to capture the effect of changes in
trade related to 9/11. So again, we explain the things that we think are the
usual suspects such as GDP and the exchange rate. Anything left over we
ascribe to the impact of border security.
And what do we find? Well, we find significant impacts. We actually look
at separate impacts for the third and fourth quarters of 2001 and then allow
the impacts for 2002, 2003, and 2004 to be different by year. Our study
ended in the middle of '05 in part because the data that we bought was very
expensive, costing thousands of dollars. And I thank the Border Policy
Research Institute for providing funding to purchase the data.
Turning to our results, we find exports shortfalls beginning at about five
billion dollars per quarter in the third quarter of 2001. This effect rises to a
33 See id. (stating that hiring third parties the burden of passing though border crossings is
now on the third party).
14 See id.
35 See id. (noting that most firms studied indicate an instance that other parties on the
supply chain assume responsibility for shipments).
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maximum of about 14 billion dollars in the fourth quarter of 2003. These
dollar figures reflect declines of roughly 10 to 20 percent of Canadian
exports to the United States. Now by the end of our sample period in mid-
2005, the effect is starting to become statistically non-significant. The effect
of security on trade could be attenuated after 2003 because of all the benefits
of programs like FAST, C-TPAT as well as the increase in personnel
working at the border. The drop in exports could also be reduced because
there is less non-commercial traffic holding up the truck traffic. For whatever
reason, by the end of our sample, the effects of security on trade are getting
smaller and starting to go away.36
Another interesting result from our research is that we did not find any
significant effect for traffic going from the United States to Canada.37 So
most of the security effects on trade seem to be going in one direction, which
might not be surprising because we know that the border security was
increased more for entry into the United States than for entry into Canada.
On the other hand, our finding of an asymmetric impact of security on
trade is puzzling because many items that cross the border (pistons for use in
cars, for example) travel across the border may times before they are sold to
a consumer in a final product., For products like these, if there is an increased
cost of getting into the United States, that is also going to impact trade going
to Canada.38 So the effect of tighter U.S. border security should not be
showing up in only one direction unless the big trade impacts we are seeing
are for the firms who are the least likely to ship components that cross the
border multiple times. Instead, our security-related trade effects could be
driven by smaller businesses that are doing more one-way as opposed to two-
way trade. So that is a possible interpretation of what we are seeing here.
One piece of evidence that may support this small versus large firm
interpretation is that when we do our analysis at the level of individual ports
of entry, we see less of a trade effect for ports with a lot of automotive-sector
trade such as Detroit, Buffalo or Niagara Falls (although we do see a big
effect for Port Huron which we know is auto-related). 39 Detroit and Buffalo-
36 See generally, Anneliese, supra note 19 ("54% of all respondents indicated that in the 2
years since 2004, delays had decreased significantly and border crossings were no longer as
difficult or time consuming").
37 See Anneliese, supra note 19.
38 See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 15 (indicating that "Goods often cross the border repeat-
edly as value is added at each production stage. Even small increases in border barriers such as
border security costs are magnified as parts cross the border multiple times").
39 See U.S. Department of Transportation, Fort Huron, Michigan - Land Gateway, Bureau
of Transportation Statistics (2006), available at
http://www.bts.gov/publications/americas-freight-transportation-gateways/highlights-of top
25 freight-gatewaysbyshipment value/port huron/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008)
(concluding that "since 1999 truck's share of land trade crossing through Port Huron has de-
clined from 61 percent").
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Niagara seem to recover more quickly than some of the other eastern ports
(such as Champlain-Rouses Point, Highgate Springs, or Alexandria Bay-
Lansdowne) and most of the west coast ports.4°
This is probably a good point to acknowledge that Michael Burt from the
Conference Board of Canada uses an approach similar to ours but comes up
with estimates that are somewhat smaller.4' I will not get into details of
econometric methodology, but there are some differences in approach that
account for these different results. Burt uses a different sample period, for
example, but we do not think that is the whole story. We have ongoing
discussions about methodology, and of course we believe ours is the correct
one. But I will be modest on the fact there is some debate.
To explore the effects of a longer sample period we have extended our
sample to include an earlier time period. When we go back and look at the
results for a sample starting in 1976, we find evidence that the increased
trade prompted by formal Canada-U.S. trade agreements has been eroded.
This effect is illustrated by the graph shown on the screen which measures
the year on the horizontal axis and the volume of trade on the vertical axis.
Between the beginning of the longer sample period in 1976 and CUSFTA
in 1989, we see a steady yearly growth of trade shown by the increasing line.
What we think happened in 1989 is that with the beginning of the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement, the line gets steeper as trade grows more quickly
over time.42 This faster growth of trade shows the positive impact of signing
a Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States.
Trade continues to grow at this faster rate until 2001 when border security
increases and the line shifts down. The pattern implied by this story is
exactly what our statistical results are telling us. We are finding that the
initial steepening of the line in 1989 followed by the drop in 2001 have
almost brought us back to where we would have been if trade had continued
to grow at its pre-1989 rate.
This reversal in our statistical results illustrates the concerns that Danielle
Goldfarb mentions in her study. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that
companies are starting to revert to some of their pre-free-trade practices, 43 so
40 U.S. Department of Transportation, North American Freight Transportation: U.S. Trade
with Canada and Mexico, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2006), available at
http://www.bts.gov/publications/northamerican freight transportation/ (discussing the three
busiest truck crossings at the U.S.-Canadian Border; Detroit, MI; Port Huron, MI; and Niaga-
ra/Buffalo, NY). (last viewed Oct. 10, 2008).41 Burt, Michael, Tighter Border Security and Its Effects on Canadian Exports, The Confe-
rence Board of Canada, June 2007, available at
htt://www.internationaltransportforum.org/2OO9/pdf/CDN TighterBorder.pdf
2 United States - Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
1851, U.S.-Can., Oct. 4, 1988.
43 E.g., Goldfarb, supra note 16.
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that some of the adjustments that were made to take advantage of that faster
growth are now being undone." So we have a fear that the benefits of trade
liberalization are being undone by border security.
Our graph can be used to make the point that if you do not actually take
into account the increase in the pace of growth between 1989 and 2001, you
miss-measure the size of the trade effect due to border security. The size of
the trade effect that Steve and I measure is the difference between the volume
of trade after 2001 and where it would have been if it had not shifted down in
2001. If we ignore the fact that NAFTA in 1994 and CUSFTA in 1989 had
trade-enhancing benefits, we would have underestimated the growth rate of
trade between 1989 and 2001 and our estimate of the impact of security on
trade would have been too small.
To sum up, we find statistical evidence that increased security in the post-
9/11 period might have undone some of the benefits of NAFTA, at least
temporarily. I think that Gary has some ideas of how we can avoid having
those security costs and how we can start to take trade forward again.
MS. MARTIN: Thank you very much, Paul. And now I will turn the floor
over to Gary.
UNITED STATES SPEAKER
Gary Hufbauert
DR. HUFBAUER: I really want to endorse Paul's book. When we wrote
NAFTA Revisited, published a couple years ago, we looked for data on the
security impact,45 and there was nothing like what you have here. And the
numbers are very sharp, $10 billion of Canadian exports lost a quarter, $40
billion lost a year.46 That is significant. And secondly, there is probably an
44 See id. (arguing that "these new behaviours [are] reversions back to those that existed
before the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement").
Gary Clyde Hufbauer resumed his position as Reginald Jones Senior Fellow in 1998.
Previously he was the Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Financial Diplomacy at
Georgetown University, and served in the U.S. Treasury Department from 1974 to1980. Dr.
Hufbauer holds an A.B from Harvard College, a Ph.D. in Economics from King College at
Cambridge University, and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. His co-authored
publications include Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, third edition (2007), US Taxation of
Foreign Income (2007), US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes (2006), and
NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (2005).
45 See Hufbauer, supra note 14.
46 E.g., John C. Taylor, Douglas Robideaux & George C. Jackson, The U.S.-Canada Bor-
der: Cost Impacts, Causes, and Short to Long Term Management Options 9, Michigan De-
partment of Transportation (2003)
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adverse differential effect on smaller and medium-sized companies, and I
will come back to that in a moment. Paul and Steve Globerman have written
a very fine study which I think is a landmark in the field.
While everyone knows that trade and foreign direct investment are
growing across North America, the fact of the matter is that trade between
the U.S. and Canada and direct investment between the U.S. and Canada are
far, far below their potential.47 Yes, the magnitudes are better than they
would have been thanks to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and
NAFTA,48 but the magnitudes are well below their potential.
The paper that I am alluding to is one where a colleague of mine and I
looked at the big reasons for the shortfall.49 One obvious suspect is currency
fluctuations. It is a Canadian choice to have a Canadian dollar. There are
good macroeconomic reasons for that. But different currencies do kill trade
and economic integration.
Another reason for the shortfall is the array of regulatory barriers; this is
Michael Hart's great specialty. 50 Regulatory barriers are very pernicious in
reducing the extent of integration between the U.S. and Canadian markets.51
The third reason, and the one I am going to talk about, is the security tax.
Everybody knows about the rising security tax. We are paying this rising tax
because we want to avert future adverse events. But we also want to think
about how we deal with the aftermath of the next terrorist episode.
Like many people in this room, I am persuaded there will be another
terrorist event. When it comes is hard to say. But let me focus for a moment
on an event that would be quite destructive to economic integration: that
would be a suicide vessel hitting an oil tanker on the high seas. Then all ports
would be closed, at least all U.S. ports would be closed, and then we would
have to deal with the aftermath. Today we are paying security taxes to try to
52avoid such events, even though one may at some point happen.
Here's the interesting thing about security taxes. When we think about
security, broadly, we do not tax participants who are in the theater of battle. 53
41 See id. at 23.
48 See, Hufbauer, supra note 14.
49 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Free Trade in Free Fall? Canada-
U.S. NontariffBarriers, 8 ONE ISSUE, Two VOICES -Feb 2008), available at
http://www. wilsoncenter. org/events/docs/Nontariff/%2OBarriersl i2v8.pdf.
0 See Hart, supra note 8.
51 See Michael Hart & Bill Dymond, The Geography of Integration 13-16 (2005) (discuss-
ing the impact of regulatory barriers on the two countries).
52 See generally, Lisa M. Seghetti, Jennifer E. Lake, and William H. Robinson, Border and
Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies, Congressional Research Service
(March 29, 2005) (describing the current border policy programs in use to attempt to avoid
terrorist attacks).
51 See 26 U.S.C. § 112 (2007) (excluding from gross income pay received while serving in
a combat zone for the armed forces).
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We generally pay for security through taxes, broadly distributed sales taxes,
income taxes, whatever.54
So to be very specific on that point, we have a security problem in the
55Middle East. We are fighting a couple of wars there, partly because it is an
oil area.56 We might not be fighting those wars if the problem were in the
Congo even though a lot of people are being killed there. 7 But do we put a
special tax on oil imported from the Middle East? We do not.58 We support
the military through all our taxes. And most of us are happy to make those
tax payments.59
But when we come to border security, where do we put the taxes? We put
the cost on the shippers and the producers. 60 This way of paying the security
tax does fragment markets, and I would suggest that our leaders need to think
about that.
I live in Washington and I wanted to get my NEXUS card for trips to
Canada. So I went through the website and disclosed my whole history since
the second grade, how much I drank, and on and on. I finally get to the page
where I schedule an interview. But no interviews are conducted in
Washington. Instead, I can go up to Buffalo, which I am sure would be an
interesting trip, or I can go to Toronto. While I travel often to Toronto, I do
not want to make a special trip for my interview, so I still do not have my
NEXUS card.
We talked about the 100 percent cargo scanning requirements under the
Container Security Initiative. 61 That is coming on very soon. This will make
life more difficult for a lot of smaller countries.62 Exporters based in those
54 E.g., J. R. Hicks, U.K. Hicks & L. Rostas, The Taxation of War Wealth 29-34 (Oxford
University Press 1941).
55 See Belasco, Amy, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11 at 1, Congressional Research Service, (July 14, 2008).
56 E.g., Edward Nell & Willi Semmler, The Iraq War and the World Oil Economy, 17
Constellations 557, 569-70 (2007); See also, Greenspan, Alan, The Age of Turbulence: Adven-
tures in a New World 463 (Penguin Press 2007) ("I am saddened that it is politically inconve-
nient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war is largely about oil").
57 Pierre Englebert & James Ron, Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville's
Ambivalent Resource Curse, 37 Comp. Pol. 61, 61-62 (2004) ("three main militias ... directly
killed at least 12,000 persons... [and] displaced 860,000").
58 See generally, Singer, S. Fred, How to Trim Oil Imports, Dampen Price Swings, 8 J.
Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 116, 117 (1989) (discussing the options for taxing oil imports).
59 See Office of Management and Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United
Stated Government Fiscal Year 2008 at 339-40 (2007) (totaling the combined spending from
the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs Departments at 23% of
the total taxable outlays in 2007).
60 See Anneliese, supra note 19.
" 6 U.S.C. § 982(a) (2007) (listing the SAFE Port Act as requiring one hundred percent
screening of cargo containers and high-risk containers).
62 See, e.g., Stephen L. Caldwell, Dir., Homeland Security and Justice, Supply Chain Secu-
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countries will first have to ship to one of the larger ports, before shipping to
the United States, and that is not going to promote development.63
Paul talked about how you translate time delays into trade costs. The
interesting thing is that he reported results. I have seen some other gravity
model results dealing with North Africa.64 The finding is that, if you increase
the time of shipments by a couple of days, you cut the trade a lot.65
Within the Container Security Initiative, it should be possible to reach an
agreement that sealed containers arriving in Canadian ports and transported
south, will not be scanned a second time when they enter the United States. 66
These containers should all be radio tracked on their journey through Canada
to the U.S. border.
Everything I say here echoes one of the questions at lunch directed to
Ambassador Wilson. We are talking cultural change as a precursor to reform.
Americans need to accept the basic proposition that there is risk everyplace,
there is risk in shipping from Texas to Colorado. You can have terrorists in
668Texas.67 They might ship to Colorado to carry out their terrorism. 68 But the
risk is not higher on goods coming from Canada to the United States thanfrom Texas to Colorado. 69 That is the basic proposition. Before we can make
rity: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, Testimony Before
the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and
Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate (June 12, 2008),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08533t.pdf. (discussing that some countries
consider the one hundred percent scanning requirement an unfair barrier to trade) (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008).
63 id.
64 See, e.g., Alberto Portugal-Perez & John S. Wilson, Trade Costs in Africa: Barriers and
Opportunities for Reform, World Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Policy Research Working Paper
4619 (2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1269268 (last
visited on Oct. 10, 2008).
65 See generally, id. at 2 (discussing the prohibitively high cost of trade due to multiple
factors in Sub-Saharan African countries).
66 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Container Security Initiative, available at
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/trade-security/csi.xml (last visited Oct. 10
2008).
67 E.g., Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (upholding that the Texas based Holy Land foundation, was correctly categorized a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
68 Cf Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, National Security Division,
Terrorism in the United States: 1997 4-5 (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1997), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terr97.pdf (last visited Oct. 10 2008)(describing a do-
mestic terrorist plot to attack Fort Hood, Texas and the terrorists planed return to a safe house
located in Colorado); see also Whidden, Michael J., Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and
United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2849, 2859-60 (2001).
69 See MacPherson, supra note 31 ("To date, no U.S.-bound commodity shipments from
Canada have been found to contain bombs, bio-chemical weapons, or other illegal sub-
stances").
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changes, somebody at a leadership level has to get this message across. Of
course Canadians have to accept the same proposition about U.S. goods.
I will not spend much time on travelers except to say that we come back
to a security tax. Somebody showed me a credit card-type of device that has
a radio chip, and that is a good improvement for travelers. 70 But these things
cost money, and what we are doing is putting that cost on individuals, many
of whom in do not have a passport or do not have one of these smart driver's
licenses. We need to think about subsidizing this cost for the next five years.
When we think about what we are paying generally for security, this is a very
small amount of money.71
Now let us turn to goods. Here I totally endorse this idea where we have
certified examinations at the factory in Canada or the United States prior to
shipment.72 And we have joint rules.73 The merchandise is put in sealed
trucks and shipped across the border.74 The containers are not scanned a
second time at the border except for occasional random audits.
But coming back to my first principle, we ought to have the same
frequency of random audits on trucks carrying containers between California
and Illinois as for trucks carrying containers from Quebec to Michigan. For
other regulations and for product taxes, we have already accepted the
national treatment principle that we are not going to put a higher burden on
shipments between the United States and Canada than we do within our
respective countries. We should accept the same principle for shipping
goods, and use high-tech equipment to inspect containers in both cases.75
Looking forward, we should go in the direction that security checks are
generally conducted at the North American perimeter.76 This is slowly
happening, bit by bit, as we have heard today. All I am urging is that we
make perimeter inspection an announced goal, and go more rapidly in that
direction to reduce congestion at the border.
70 See generally, Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative (WHTI) Passport Card Technology Choice: Vicinity RFID, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/prl 161115330477.shtm (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (cit-
ing the benefits of the WHTI card on border crossings).
See generally, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Passport Card, available at
http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt card/ppt card_3926.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (the
cost of the card for passport book holders is $20.00 USD, cost for first time applicants is
$45.00 USD).
72 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 66.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See generally, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article III, 61 Stat. A-I 1, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (Oct. 30, 1947) (outlining the "National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation").
76 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 66.
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And to get here, we need a strong push from the President and the Prime
Minister. And this may happen now that NAFTA has been put into play for
the next administration in Washington. Prime Minister Harper may very well
take up the challenge as well.
Prime Minister Harper, and President Bush should agree to launch a
commission which explores what practical steps can be taken to push the
security examination back to the perimeter.
I know all these recommendations sound like pie in the sky. But as was
mentioned earlier, the United States depends on Canadian energy.77 I would
say to officials sitting in Ottawa, there is no reason why the energy card
should not be played, in some suitable way, to move forward the agenda on
security.
Thank you.
MS. MARTIN: Given the fact that Gary has to leave promptly at the end
of the session, I will ask that questions be kept terse I guess. But let us begin
with opening the floor to questions.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF PAUL STORER AND
GARY HUFBAUER
MS. IRISH: Maureen Irish, University of Windsor. A quick question to
Gary concerning the security perimeter. Would this have to be namely for
goods? I have been interested in the connection between security for goods
and security for persons. As we heard in the last panel, there are lots of
differences or significant problems with the safe third country agreement.78
But can we in fact separate out security for goods and security for persons?
DR. HUFBAUER: I think security for persons is much harder for privacy
reasons which I am sure you know better than I do.7 9 Also, we have different
standards for issuing visas. I would like to see progress on persons, but I
think we are much closer to getting progress on the goods issue.
MR. CRANE: Thank you. David Crane. Now that Gary's raised the
interest in proposition of playing the energy card he says in a suitable way,
how would he suggest that be played then?
DR. HUFBAUER: David Crane is a brilliant commentator, so he
probably has better and more subtle ideas than I do. It cannot be that Canada
would threaten to join OPEC or anything like that. But the U.S. really needs
77 See Canada Energy Data, Energy Information Administration (2008), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Canada/pdf.pdf (showing the single largest source of oil imports
to the United States is from Canada)(last visited Oct. 10 2008).
78 See Jacobs, Kemi, The Safe Third Country Agreement, Policy Options, at 33 (Sept.
2002).
79 See generally, Seghetti, supra note 52 (describing the Computer Aided Passenger Pre-
Screening System (CAPPS) which was discontinued due to privacy concerns).
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more energy from Canada (which is happening anyway) and Canada
probably is chaffing a bit at the provision in NAFTA which essentially says
that Canada will not try to create a two-tier energy market-cheaper energy
for Canada than shipped to the U.S.-and in an emergency energy will be
proportionately allocated. 0
So I guess the subtle way would be this. Tell the U.S. leaders that we
know you want Canada to continue going forward with the Mackenzie oil
sands development in Alberta, and we know you want more hydropower, and
so on.
We Canadian leaders will discuss these energy security issues, but
Canada also wants a serious reconsideration of how the security partnership
is handled because, if Paul Storer is right, this is having a lot of adverse
affect. Not on GM probably, not on Ford, but on numerous smaller
companies. The security tax is depressing investment in Canada.
So we have to deal with this because you, the U.S. by your policies are
basically depriving us of one of our great advantages which is assured
proximity to the U.S. market.
MS. PAWLUCH: Quick question on the continental perimeter concept.
Can it move forward with Canada and the U.S. to the exclusion of Mexico?
And if not, is that not one of the hurdles to moving forward? I see you have
identified it as a joint approach. Realistically, can you see it moving forward
that way?
DR. HUFBAUER: Whoever asks the next question should toss it to Paul,
but I will briefly try to answer this one.
I believe that the U.S. can go forward with Canada first. And if we cannot
go forward with Canada on some new concept, who can we deal with?
Beyond Canada, there is Mexico, there is Singapore, there is Hong Kong,
and others. If we want to create a larger zone of safety than we now have,
Canada is obviously the place to start.
And I honestly believe that Mexicans would understand that this issue
first has to be addressed on a pilot basis with Canada before a security
perimeter can be considered for Mexico. So I do not think Mexico would
object if the U.S. and Canada went ahead.8'
MS. FREEDMAN: Hi. Katherine Freedman from the University of
Buffalo.
At several points today there have been conversations regarding the
security perimeter and reference with respect to renegotiating NAFTA and
80 See Gordon Laxer & John Dillon, Over a Barrel: Exiting From NAFTA 's Proportionali-
ty Clause (Parkland Institute, 2008).
81 See Wallace Clement & Leah F. Vosko, Changing Canada: Political Economy as
Transformation 244 (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) (indicating that Mexico's posi-
tion in the [security perimeter] arrangement is ambiguous).
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rebuilding NAFTA. And I am just curious if either of the panelists have any
opinion or ideas with respect to pushing the envelope regarding the
establishment of a customs union as well between Canada and the United
States?
From my perspective, the security perimeter, it is a different issue from a
customs union. And I am just wondering if there are any discussions in that
regard, if these two issues should be handled simultaneously, or if we should
move forward on one and see what can be accomplished with the other?
MR. STORER: I think that the main reason we will not have a customs
union in the short run it is one of those "third-rail" political issues in Canada.
I have been told by some industry groups that academic economists should
stop using the term "customs union" because we hurt their efforts to broaden
and deepen NAFTA. Every time a reference to customs unions gets reported
in the news, people view that it is going to be some sort of political union.
CBC has been running a miniseries on this lately about the Trojan Horse
series.82
So a full-blown customs union is probably not going to come right out of
the sky, but one thing that is interesting, is that there is a mini-customs union
right now in the NAFTA. This sectoral customs union has been in place since
1994 for computers and computer parts. It would be very interesting do some
follow-up work on how this sectoral customs union has worked out.83 It does
not seem like Canada's lost its sovereignty, and it has been implemented in
the current framework with Cuba still on the bad person list.
So maybe just like the Auto Pact was extended beyond that sector, maybe
that mini-customs union in computers and computer parts could be extended
into some more sectors that people do not feel are sensitive. And as people
realized that the gradual extension of the customs union happened without
disaster, maybe that would point the way to move to a full customs union
once people realize it is not the threat they think it is.
Oh, can I say something about perimeter security? The work I have seen
by the Perimeter Clearance Coalition shows several ways to implement a lot
of the benefits of perimeter security.84 Countries can check people's
82 See CBC Television - The Trojan Horse, available at
htt://www.cbc.ca/trojanhorse/synopsis.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
3 Goldfarb, Danielle, The Road to a Canada-U.S. Customs Union: Step-By-Step or in a
Single Bound?, 17 C.D. Howe Institute (2003), available at
http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_184.pdf (last visited Oct. 10 2008)("NAFTA already
has a de facto sectoral customs union with a common external tariff in certain automatic data-
processing goods and their parts").
84 See generally, Perimeter Clearance Coalition, Perimeter Clearance Strategy: To Realize
a Smart Border for the 21st Century, Canadian Tourism Commission (2003), available at
http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/lu86-1-2003E.pdf (last visited Oct. 10 2008)(discussing
the advantages to both tourists and governmental authorities).
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credentials at the point of entry in North America so that we do not have to
double-check them again if the visitors to North America cross the Canada-
U.S. border. This perimeter verification can be done without giving up
sovereignty. One idea is to have a card with an embedded chip that would let
you know what kind of permissions a visitor has to enter the United States or
Canada.
So it would not be that you would be just letting people into North
America and then just waving the door open, but you would be coding
information for both Canada and the United States at the first point of entry.
And so then when the person arrived to the Canada-U.S. border, this encoded
card would already provide that information. It would just expedite crossing.
You might not just walk right through the Canada-U.S. border but you would
walk through a lot faster because you would be scrutinizing the person the
most intensively when they came from, say, Belgium to Canada or the
United States. And I think that method has a lot of the benefits of the
perimeter security without having to give up sovereignty.
MS. MARTIN: Any more questions?
MR. CRANE: Can I make another point?
MS. MARTIN: Sure.
MR. CRANE: You touch on something interesting.
These border differences do affect behavior, and Gary mentioned, for
example, investment. There is no doubt that while the Ford Motor Company
and GM want total ease-of-border access, it may be at the economic
development offices of Michigan and Ohio would prefer to see border
differences so they can say to Japanese automakers you are better off
locating in the U.S.
On the Canadian side it is very interesting because of differences and how
we handle immigrants, that Microsoft has now put a big R & D lab in
Vancouver because of Microsoft's difficulties getting those same people into
the United States.85 So it also might also be interesting to study how these
differences also lead to these kinds of outcomes.
In fact, I was at a conference yesterday where a suggestion that other
major cities should try to follow Vancouver's example and get one of things,
and I remember after 9/11, Mike Lazaridis who runs Research in Motion
suggested that because of difficulties of foreign post-ops getting into the
U.S., that our universities who are supported by pretty big government
should just sweep up all these people from China and India and the Middle
85 See Gates, Bill, Testimony before the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives (March 12, 2008), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/Presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/congress.mspx (last visited
Oct. 10, 2008).
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East and Russia and elsewhere at the post-op level and bring them into our
University and create our next generation of professors.
DR. HUFBAUER: Leaping in with a very brief comment on that. You are
right, David. There is a lot of unspoken protectionism going on, and
everyone here knows the current mood in the United States which is not in
favor of going ahead on the liberalization agenda. It is not necessarily going
back quickly, but it is certainly not in favor of going ahead, and certainly
there are multiple small differences of all kinds in regulatory barriers. There
is always somebody who has a small advantage or even a big advantage in
regulatory differences and is going to play it.
For the last couple of decades, national governments have been pushing in
the other direction with the assistance of companies who are on the other side
of the debate and really want to move forward on liberalization.86 But right
now the liberalization agenda is stalled. I hope it will get going again. But
your guess is better than mine.
On the specific aspect of immigration, this is another place where the U.S.
is falling behind.8 7 My colleague, Jacob Kierkegaard, wrote a paper-which
is on our website--on what is happening in terms of the high-skilled fraction
of the U.S. population, including skilled immigrants, and what is happening
in Canada. 88 The U.S. is distinctly falling behind in terms of skilled
immigrants and the general skill level of the population.
MR. HERMAN: Larry Herman from Toronto.
I agree with Gary's comments. I always agree with Gary's comments-he
knows that-about the difficulty of moving ahead on the trade liberalization
agenda currently in the United States, so that is a reality. It is a political
reality. So pushing that button is not going to get very far with the United
States.
My view is that the Canadian response particularly in light of what some
of the candidates for President have said about the trade liberalization, which
is to roll back I think the gains of the NAFTA, I think that Canada should be
pursuing another avenue, and I think the security avenue is the right one.
What we have heard today I think is that there are a myriad of
arrangements, agreements, or different sorts of programs to try to facilitate
86 See generally, Underwood, Tamara, Export Assistance Programs for Small and Me-
dium-Sized Enterprises Offered by the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce (2003), available at http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/underwood-smes.pdf
(last visited Oct. 10 2008)(discussing the governmental support programs for small and me-
dium sized businesses).
87 See Kirkegaard, Jacob Funk, US High-Skilled Immigration Policy: A Self-Inflicted
Wound, Yale Global, July 1, 2008, available at
htt://Yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1 1023(last visited Oct. 10 2008).
8 See id.
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transport of trade, but there has been no big-picture agreement. 89 I think that
is what is needed.
In fact, if you look at the-if you look at the treaties, the government-to-
government, federal-government-to-federal-government, state-to-state treaty
between Canada and the United States, in this complex world there are very,
very few.
What is needed I think is a-and I like your comments on this-is an
approach that said okay, let us not deal with a trade liberalization issue. Let
us pursue President to Prime Minister, Canada-U.S-forget Mexico-
Canada-U.S., a treaty, a major treaty that deals with the security issue
because that I think from what I have heard both of you say would help
advance the trades liberalization agenda. It would be called a security
agenda, but it would deal away with a lot of the problems at the border.
DR. HUFBAUER: I will give a quick comment and then, Paul, you
should weigh in on this one.
Yes, I think that is a great idea, and I think there are three big issues that
conceivably could be packaged together. Energy I have spoken about, that is
a continuing issue. There is hopefully a joint U.S.-Canada approach on cap-
and-trade or carbon taxes to address climate change. And then there is
security.
I think there is a package there that could be put together with
imagination, which then ultimately would be widened, just as the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement was, to embrace other countries once we had
pioneered it.
MR. STORER: I feel that there is a way to package some of the trade
liberalizing initiatives, such as getting rid of nuisance procedures at the
border like rules of origin, and using these improvements to brand the
package as being security-enhancing. What you can do is reallocate people
from doing one low-value function to another high-value function that
enhances security. This might be the way to achieve both deeper integration
and greater security and I think that would probably be a good way to go
forward.
MS. MARTIN: Any final questions?
DR. KING: I wanted to ask Larry Herman and our friends on the panel,
did you favor the arbitration of disputes under that treaty?
MR. HERMAN: Sure. Absolutely.
DR. KING: How about the U.S., what do you think, Gary?
DR. HUFBAUER: Would I favor it? By all means I would favor it.
Whether it would come, I do not know. There is a pushback against legal
procedures.
89 See generally, Taylor, supra note 46 (discussing possible long-term solutions to replace
the current border measures, specifically an "external perimeter").
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DR. KING: Is that a barrier if we do not arbitrate our disputes under the
treaty?
DR. HUFBAUER: Well, yeah. As you know, Henry, better than I, there
are many ways of doing arbitration, but I think when you do not have some
kind of dispute-settlement mechanism, the words remain basically words,
and they do not have a bite.
MR. STORER: I would like to see it come in to almost the same way that
antitrust or competition law, actual precedent-making in court decisions.
MR. HERMAN: I am sorry, but on this dispute settlement, one of the
problems with the NAFTA is that there is no permanent dispute settlement
process.
DR. HUFBAUER: Right.
MR. HERMAN: It is ad hoc. You could envision institutionalizing
NAFTA dispute settlement, have a permanent NAFTA court, judges who
have tenure, they can sit in Washington. I do not even care if they sit in
Ottawa, they can sit in Washington. They can deal with all the NAFTA
disputes, Chapter 11, Chapter 9, and Chapter 20, but you could also
institutionalize that body to deal with security-related issues where there is a
dispute subject to all the national security and sovereignty issues. But there
will be things that will have to be settled by an independent arm's-length
body on some of the securities issues, and it can be part of the same process.
DR. KING: What about a court?
DR. HUFBAUER: Well, I think what Larry has outlined is very close to a
court. You may not want to give it that particular name. You may want to
call it a commission, and you can put very distinguished people on it: retired
appellate court judges and people of equivalent distinction. It would
command a lot of respect.
MS. MARTIN: Well, please join me in giving a warm round of applause
for the panelists.
(Session concluded.)
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